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A Introduction
Adverse human rights impacts occur in business operations across all sectors.1
There is well–documented evidence of such harms including, for example, low
wages, excessive working hours, and child labor in the electronics and apparel
† Legal and Policy Coordinator of the Frameworks Program at the International Corporate Ac-
countability Roundtable; ABA Section of International, Chair of the Corporate Social Responsibility
Committee, Vice Chair of the Young Lawyers Interest Network, and Steering Committee Member
of the International Human Rights Committee; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center
‡ Legal and Policy Fellow at the International Corporate Accountability Roundtable; J.D.,
Georgetown University Law Center
1 See e.g., Robert Stumberg et al., Turning a Blind Eye? Respecting Human Rights in Govern-
ment Purchasing 8–15 (Sept. 2014), http://issuu.com/_icar_/docs/procurement_report_-
_final/1?e=6698884/9237920.
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sectors; human trafficking and questionable use of force in the private security
sector; and forced labor and unsafe working conditions in the agricultural sector,
to name a few.2
At the global level, two major initiatives are currently underway that aim to
address such harms by increasing business respect for human rights. First, gov-
ernments have begun to make commitments to implement business and human
rights frameworks in policy documents known as National Action Plans (NAPs)
on business and human rights.3 These NAPs are most often aimed at furthering
implementation of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Hu-
man Rights (UNGPs), which were unanimously adopted by the United Nations
Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in 2011.4 Second, an international process
toward a binding treaty on business and human rights has begun through the
UNHRC’s adoption in 2014 of a resolution tabled by a group of States demand-
ing mandatory measures in addressing business–related human rights harms.5
Since the adoption of this resolution, however, some stakeholders have voiced
concerns that this new treaty process and the creation of NAPs are in compe-
tition with one another.6 Specifically, some have expressed concerns that the
treaty process may divert resources and attention away from domestic imple-
mentation of the UNGPs, that States would use the treaty process as an excuse
not to make domestic reforms in line with the UNGPs, and that reopening nego-
tiations around business and human rights standards could cause a weakening
of consensus gained around the UNGPs.7
This article seeks to demonstrate that, not only are NAPs and the treaty
process not in competition, these two global developments strongly benefit one
another. First, NAPs processes will support the treaty process by identifying the
most pressing gaps in protections and by highlighting which business and human
rights issues governments agree on the most, which can then be used to target the
content and scope of the treaty. Second, once a treaty is created, States that have
2 Id.
3 National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights: A Toolkit for the Develop-
ment, Implementation, and Review of State Commitments to Business and Human Rights
Frameworks, 8 Danish Inst. for Human Rights & Int’l Corporate Accountability
Roundtable, (June 2014),http://icar.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/DIHR-ICAR-
National-Action-Plans-NAPs-Report3.pdf; Bus. &Human Rights Res. Ctr.,National Action
Plans, http://business-humanrights.org/en/un-guiding-principles/implementation-
tools-examples/implementation-by-governments/by-type-of-initiative/national-
action-plans (last visited Oct. 23, 2015).
4 Special Representative of the Secretary–General on the Issue of Human Rights &
Transnational Corps. & Other Bus. Enters., Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” Framework,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (2011) (by John Ruggie).
5 Human Rights Council Res. A/HRC/26/9, Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 26th Sess., June
10–27, 2014 (June 26, 2014).
6 See, e.g., Josua Loots, Of Aims and Means: More Coordination and Harmonization of Ef-
forts are Critical to Further Progress on Business and Human Rights, Inst. for Human Rights &
Business (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.ihrb.org/commentary/of-aims-and-means.html.
7 See, e.g., Mark Taylor, A Business and Human Rights Treaty? Why Activists Should Be Wor-
ried, Inst. for Human Rights & Business (June 4, 2014), http://www.ihrb.org/commentary/
board/business-and-human-rights-treaty-why-activists-should-be-worried.html
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gone through NAPs processes will be better equipped to identify which domes-
tic reforms are necessary to become treaty–compliant. Third, NAPs processes
lead to increased stakeholder capacity and knowledge about complex business
and human rights issues, which then contributes to stakeholder engagement in
the treaty process becoming more meaningful. Fourth, the dialogue around the
treatymay foster new or strengthened relationships between business and human
rights stakeholders from the Global North and those from the Global South,
as well as strengthen already existing networks of business and human rights
stakeholders in a way that will foster collaboration on efforts to implement the
UNGPs. Finally, the increased attention on business and human rights that the
treaty process has generated may bring new voices to the discussion around the
implementation of the UNGPs. As such, these two roads currently travelled by
business and human rights stakeholders are more converged than diverged, and,
rather than viewing these efforts to be in opposition, each initiative should lever-
age the opportunities provided by the other.
A.1 The Origins of Business and Human Rights Frameworks
The first international attempt to define the human rights responsibilities of busi-
ness was theDraft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations
andOther Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (“Draft Norms”).
The Draft Norms created direct legal obligations on companies in relation to
human rights. However, these standards failed to gain support at the UN Com-
mission on Human Rights (“Commission”).8
After the Draft Norms failed, the Commission requested that then–Secretary
General Kofi Annan appoint a Special Representative to move the discussion on
businesses and human rights forward.9 In response, the Secretary General ap-
pointed Professor John Ruggie to take on this role in 2005.10 After intensive
research and global consultations with business, civil society, and governments
over the course of three years, Professor Ruggie presented the Protect, Respect,
and Remedy Framework to the UNHRC in 2008.11 This framework is orga-
nized into three pillars. Pillar I outlines the State duty to protect against human
rights abuses perpetrated by third parties, including business.12 Pillar II out-
lines the corporate responsibility to respect human rights in their operations.13
Pillar III details the need for victims of human rights abuses to have access to
8 The UN Commission on Human Rights was the predecessor to the current UN Human Rights
Council. The Commission no longer exists. United Nations, The UN “Protect, Respect and





11 Special Representative of the Secretary–General on the Issue of Human Rights &
Transnational Corps. & Other Bus. Enters., Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for
Business and Human Rights, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (2008) (by John Ruggie).
12 Id. at ¶ 9.
13 Id. at ¶¶ 54–55.
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effective remedy, both judicial and non–judicial.14 After the UNHRC welcomed
this framework, it extended Professor Ruggie’s mandate for an additional three
years, tasking him with operationalizing the framework.15
The outcome of Professor Ruggie’s second mandate was the United Nations
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), which were unan-
imously adopted by the United Nations Human Rights Council in June 2011.16
The UNGPs are organized by the Protect, Respect, and Remedy Framework’s
three pillars and provide foundational principles and operational principles un-
der each pillar. Each individual principle also includes detailed commentary.
A.2 The Three Pillars
The three pillars of the UNGPs provide the most internationally recognized
framework for discussing and understanding respective roles and responsibilities
in addressing business–related human rights harms. Pillar I outlines the States’
legal duty to protect against human rights abuses perpetrated by third parties,
including business.17 For example, Guiding Principle 4 says that States should
“take additional steps to protect against human rights abuses by business en-
terprises that are owned or controlled by the State, or that receive substantial
support and services from State agencies such as export credit agencies and of-
ficial investment insurance or guarantee agencies, including, where appropriate,
by requiring human rights due diligence.”18
Moving beyond the role of the State, Pillar II outlines the corporate respon-
sibility to respect human rights, for example, by having a policy commitment
to respect human rights (Guiding Principle 16), conducting human rights due
diligence throughout its operations (Guiding Principle 17), and providing re-
mediation when it has caused or contributed to adverse human rights impacts
(Guiding Principle 22).19 The corporate responsibility to respect is not a legal
obligation in the way the obligation of States is; instead, it constitutes society’s
baseline expectation of companies to “do no harm.”20 “Doing no harm” does
not only entail refraining from action, but also entails taking positive steps to
ensure business activities are not infringing on human rights.21 Additionally, be-
cause respecting human rights is a baseline expectation, any attempts to make
up for infringing on human rights by making a positive contribution elsewhere
(such as building a school or donating money) is inadequate.22
14 Id. at ¶ 26; United Nations, supra note 9.
15 Id.; United Nations, supra note 9.
16 Special Representative of the Secretary–General on the Issue of Human Rights &
Transnational Corps. & Other Bus. Enters., supra note 4.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Special Representative of the Secretary–General on the Issue of HumanRights&Transnational
Corps. & Other Bus. Enters., supra note 4.
20 Special Representative of the Secretary–General on the Issue of Human Rights &
Transnational Corps. & Other Bus. Enters., supra note 4, at 13; Protect, Respect and Remedy:
a Framework for Business and Human Rights, supra note 12, at ¶ 54–55.
21 Id.
22 Id.
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Finally, Pillar III details the need for victims of human rights abuses to have
access to effective remedy.23 This pillar discusses the State’s obligation to ensure
judicial remedies are effective (Guiding Principle 26), discusses the State’s obliga-
tion to provide effective non-judicial mechanisms alongside judicial mechanisms
(Guiding Principle 27), and discusses the non-judicial grievance mechanisms of
corporations and multi-stakeholder initiatives (Guiding Principles 29, 30, and
31).24
A.3 From Pillars to Practice
After adopting the UNGPs, the UNHRC also created the UN Working Group
on Business and Human Rights (UNWG) to advocate for and facilitate imple-
mentation of the UNGPs at the national level.25 The UNWG is composed of five
independent experts,26 and its mandate was extended for an additional three
years in the summer of 2014.27
The unanimous adoption of the UNGPs marked the first time that there
was an international consensus around a business and human rights frame-
work. Since their adoption, the UNGPs have been integrated into other business
and human rights frameworks, such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises in 201128 and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) Perfor-
mance Standards in 2012.29 In addition, some States have begun initial initia-
tives to implement the UNGPs at the national level. As this article will address,
a significant way in which States are taking steps to turn the UNGPs into actual
practice at the national level is through the creation of National Action Plans on
business and human rights.
A.4 National Action Plans
National Action Plans (NAPs) are policy documents created by States that detail
the actions that the State is committed to taking in order to implement interna-
23 Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, supra note 12,
at ¶ 26.
24 Special Representative of the Secretary–General on the Issue of Human Rights &
Transnational Corps. & Other Bus. Enters., supra note 4.
25 Human Rights Council Res. A/HRC/17/4, Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 17th Sess., May
30–June 17, 2011 (July 6, 2011).
26 U.N. Working Group on the Issues of Human Rights and Transnational Corpo-
rations and Other Business Enterprises, United Nations Office of the High Com-
missioner for Human Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/
WGHRandtransnationalcorporationsandotherbusiness.aspx (last visited Oct. 23, 2015).
27 Human Rights Council Res. A/HRC/26/22, Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 26th Sess.,
June 10-27, 2014 (July 15, 2014).
28 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, at 3 (2011),Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development [OECD], http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf.
29 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and IFC Sustainability Frame-
work, International Finance Corporation (IFC), http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/
c3dedb0049c51e71886d99da80c2ddf3/UNGPsandIFC-SF-DRAFT.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.
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tional, regional, or national obligations.30 States have created NAPs on a num-
ber of topics, including women’s rights, human trafficking, and climate change.31
Some of these NAPs were the result of the State’s own initiative, while others fol-
lowed calls from international organizations for their creation.32 In the case of
the UNGPs, multiple international and regional entities have called on States to
create NAPs on business and human rights in order to fuel the implementation
of these principles.
Specifically, the UNWG “strongly encourage[d] all States to develop, enact[,]
and update a national action plan as part of the State responsibility to dissem-
inate and implement the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.”33
In the EU Strategy for Corporate Social Responsibility, the European Commis-
sion issued a call for all EU Member States to develop a NAP detailing plans
to implement the UNGPs, as well as a NAP on Corporate Social Responsibil-
ity, by 2012.34 The European Council also called on all EU Member States to
develop NAPs on business and human rights by 2013.35 The Council of Eu-
rope (CoE) issued a Declaration in 2013, pushing CoE Member States to create
NAPs on business and human rights as well.36 Finally, in 2014, the UNHRC
itself adopted a resolution that “encourages all States to take steps to implement
the Guiding Principles, including to develop a national action plan or other such
framework.”37
As of the date of this article’s publication, eight countries have published
NAPs on business and human rights: the United Kingdom, Denmark, Finland,
the Netherlands, Lithuania, Sweden, Norway, and, most recently, Columbia.38
In addition, Italy and Spain have released draft NAPs, and nearly forty countries
30 Danish Inst. forHumanRights & Int’l Corporate Accountability Roundtable., supra
note 3, at 8.
31 Id. at 10.
32 Id.
33 State National Action Plans, U.N. Working Group on the Issues of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
Issues/Business/Pages/NationalActionPlans.aspx (last visited Oct. 23, 2015).
34 European Comm’n, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Re-
gions: A Renewed EU Strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility, COM (2011) 681 fi-
nal (Oct. 25, 2011), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:
0681:FIN:EN:PDF.
35 EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, Council
of the European Union (2012), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/
pressdata/EN/foraff/131181.pdf.
36 Council of Europe, Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on the UN Guiding Prin-
ciples on Business and Human Rights, https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=2185745&
Site=CM&BackColorInternet=C3C3C3&BackColorIntranet=EDB021&BackColorLogged=
F5D383(lastvisitedOct.23,2015).
37 Human Rights Council Res. A/HRC/26/22., supra note 30, at ¶ 2.
38 Bus. & Human Rights Res. Ctr., National Action Plans, http://business-humanrights.
org/en/un-guiding-principles/implementation-tools-examples/implementation-by-
governments/by-type-of-initiative/national-action-plans (last visited Oct. 23, 2015);
U.N. Working Group on the Issues of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations
and other Business Enterprises, State National Action Plans, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
Issues/Business/Pages/NationalActionPlans.aspx(lastvisitedOct.23,2015).
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across world regions have committed to developing a NAP and/or have started
the process of doing so.39
NAPs provide many benefits. First, NAPs serve as a useful tool for stakehold-
ers advocating for domestic reforms to implement the UNGPs. Because a NAP,
in theory, should lay out the government’s plan for implementing the UNGPs,
stakeholders can use the explicit commitments made in the NAP, where they ex-
ist, to hold the State accountable if it fails to follow through. Second, the process
of creating a NAP can enhance knowledge and capacity in relation to business
and human rights issues more broadly.40 This is true not only of government
officials themselves, but also of business actors and civil society organizations
(CSOs) that engage during the process.41 Third, if the government conducts a
National Baseline Assessment (NBA), as it should prior to creating its NAP, the
outcome provides a comprehensive mapping and gap analysis of current State
practice that could, and should, highlight priority areas for the specific national
context.42
Although NAPs do provide benefits, there are also challenges. Some of these
challenges are related to the process used to create a NAP. First, no government
that has released a NAP so far has conducted a comprehensive NBA, contribut-
ing to the fact that the content of NAPs to date has been disappointing.43 Second,
while governments have conducted stakeholder consultations, as far as the au-
thors are aware none of the governments that have released NAPs have made
efforts to facilitate participation in these consultations by disempowered or at-
risk stakeholders.44 Finally, there has been an overall lack of transparency about
the NAP drafting process.45 Other challenges relate to the substantive content
of NAPs. First, to date, the NAPs that have been published focus mainly on
voluntary measures and trainings, with few commitments to regulate compa-
nies.46 Second, many of the commitments made in the current NAPs are also
overly vague and do not include specific timelines or assign responsibility to a
particular entity within the government.47 Finally, Pillar III has received little
to no attention in most of the existing NAPs, which is problematic given the
39 Id. at 1.
40 Danish Inst. for Human Rights & Int’l Corporate Accountability Roundtable, Na-
tional Action Plans on Business andHumanRights: A Toolkit for theDevelopment, Implementation,
and Review of State Commitments to Business and Human Rights Frameworks 1, 9 (June 2014),
http://icar.ngo/analysis/napsreport/.
41 Id. at 27.
42 Id. at 33.
43 The assessment currently includes Denmark, Finland, the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden and
Lithuania, and will include Norway’s and Colombia’s when a translation is available. Neither
Sweden nor Lithuania have conducted an NBA. International Corporate Accountability
Roundtable & European Coalition for Corporate Justice, Assessment of Existing National
Action Plans (NAPs) on Business and Human Rights (Nov. 2015) http://icar.ngo/analysis/
icar-eccj-release-2015-update-of-national-action-plans-assessments/.
44 Id. at 3.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 4.
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importance of access to remedy for victims.48
A.5 Treaty Resolution
While the above efforts and developments have demonstratedmovement in terms
of implementation of business and human rights frameworks, many stakehold-
ers have at the same time expressed deep frustration with the slow pace of actual
change on the ground in terms of human rights protections.49 As a result, many
of these stakeholders have turned to the idea of a legally binding international
treaty as the next step.50
With the backing of several key States, support for a treaty on business and
human rights culminated in the UNHRC adopting a resolution in June 2014 to
start the process of creating such a treaty.51 The treaty resolution, which was
put before the UNHRC during its 26th session, was drafted by Ecuador and
South Africa and signed by Bolivia, Cuba, and Venezuela.52 The resolution called
for the UNHRC to “establish an open-ended intergovernmental working group
with the mandate to elaborate an international legally binding instrument on
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with respect to hu-
man rights.”53 Twenty countries, mostly from the Global South, voted in favor of
the treaty resolution. These countries were Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, China,
Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Cuba, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kenya,
Morocco, Namibia, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, South Africa, Venezuela, and
Vietnam.54 The fourteen countries that voted against the resolution are home to
many transnational corporations, including: Austria, the Czech Republic, Esto-
nia, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Montenegro, South Korea, Roma-
nia, Macedonia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.55
The rationale behind many States’ opposition to the treaty was based in part
on the fact that international human rights law has historically only governed
States.56 For example, the U.S. representative in the UNHRC at the time raised
concerns about practical questions related to how such an instrument could be
48 Id.
49 See, e.g., Josua Loots, Of Aims and Means: More Coordination and Harmonization of Ef-
forts are Critical to Further Progress on Business and Human Rights, Inst. for Human rights &
Business (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.ihrb.org/commentary/of-aims-and-means.html; Peter
Frankental, A Business and Human Rights Treaty? We Shouldn’t be Afraid to Frighten the Horses,
Inst. for Human Rights & Business (June 9, 2014), http://www.ihrb.org/commentary/
business-and-human-rights-treaty-we-shouldnt-be-afraid.html.
50 Loots, supra note 6.
51 Human Rights Council Res., supra note 5, at 1.
52 Bus. & Human Rights Res. Ctr., Human Rights Council Sessions, http://business-
humanrights.org/en/binding-treaty/un-human-rights-council-sessions (last visited Oct.
23, 2015).
53 Human Rights Council Res., supra note 5, at 2.
54 Bus. & Human Rights Res. Ctr., supra note 52, at 2.
55 Id.
56 Thalif Deen,After Losing Vote, U.S.-E.U. Threaten to Undermine Treaty, Inter Press Service
News Agency (June 28, 2014), http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/06/after-losing-vote-u-s-
eu-threaten-to-undermine-treaty/.
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applied to corporations and how States would implement the treaty domesti-
cally.57 The European Union and the United States also argued that the UNGPs
are adequate to help decrease instances of human rights abuses in business op-
erations and that proponents of the treaty had simply not given States enough
time to implement the UNGPs.58
Another contentious issue that States did not agree on during the treaty reso-
lution vote is the inclusion of a footnote that would, arguably, limit the treaty’s
application to transnational corporations and exclude domestic companies.59
The footnote, which was included in the treaty resolution, defines the term
“other business enterprises” as “all business enterprises that have a transnational
character in their operational activities, and does not apply to local businesses
registered in terms of relevant domestic law.”60 Many States that are home to
these transnational corporations, and several transnational corporations them-
selves, believe that this will undermine their companies’ competitiveness by plac-
ing additional burdens on them that companies that only operate within one
country will not face.61 Civil society has also been split on the issue; however,
this disagreement is being discussed as part of the process of building consensus
around the scope and content of the treaty going forward.62
The Intergovernmental Working Group (IGWG), which was created by the
June 2014 resolution and tasked with coordinating the elaboration of the treaty,
held its first meeting from 6–10 July 2015.63 The purpose of the first session
was to allow for “constructive deliberations on the content, scope, nature[,] and
form” of the treaty, with a particular focus on collecting oral and written inputs
from States and other stakeholders.64 The second session, which is scheduled
to occur in 2016, will have the same overall purpose as the first session.65 The
program of work for the second session will be informed by informal stakeholder
consultations that will take place prior to the session.66
Initially, some stakeholders viewed the treaty as an “anti–UNGPs” process
that would undermine advocacy for national measures to implement the UNGPs,
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Phil Bloomer, Negotiating and Fighting for a Binding Treaty on Business and Human
Rights, The Guardian, (July 27, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-
professionals-network/2015/jul/27/negotiating-and-fighting-for-a-binding-
treaty-on-business-and-human-rights.
60 Human Rights Council Res., supra note 5, at ¶ 1.
61 Bloomer, supra note 62, at 2.
62 ESCR-Net, International Federation for Human Rights, ESCR-NET & FIDH: New
Joint Treaty Initiative, https://www.escr-net.org/node/365756(lastvisitedOct.23,2015).
63 United Nations Human Rights Council,Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group
on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect fo Human Rights,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Pages/IGWGOnTNC.aspx
64 United Nations Human Rights Council, Draft Report of the Open-ended Intergovern-
mental Working Group on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Re-
spect for Human Rights para. 1 (July 10, 2015), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/
WGTransCorp/Session1/Pages/Draftreport.aspx.
65 Id. at 20.
66 Id.
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including NAPs.67 Namely, there was concern that the treaty would divert re-
sources and attention away from domestic implementation of the UNGPs (in-
cluding through NAPs), that States would use the treaty process as an excuse
not to make domestic reforms in line with the UNGPs, and that opening up
the discussion again could cause a weakening of the consensus gained around
the UNGPs in 2011.68 These arguments are discussed in more detail in the next
section of this article.
These concerns led some to believe that the treaty process and NAPs pro-
cesses (or the UNGPs more broadly) are in competition with one another and,
therefore, governments, civil society, business, and other stakeholdersmust choose
which one to support.69 However, not only are these two “tracks” not in com-
petition, but they can actually benefit each other, as this article argues.
B Thesis: Two Roads Diverged
One of the main arguments that the treaty process and the creation of NAPs are
in competition revolves around the limited resources available in the business
and human rights community.70 Specifically, there is concern that the resources
of governments, CSOs, and business, would be diverted to the treaty process,
thereby taking away resources from and undermining the UNGPs and their im-
plementation at the national level.71 This concern was heightened by the fact
that the treaty process will likely be a very political and very drawn out process,
increasing the likelihood that resources would be sucked up by involvement with
extensive Member State negotiations with no clear end date.72 Because of this,
financial and staff resources of CSOs, which are already stretched thin, could
either be moved away from pushing for domestic implementation of the UNGPs
entirely or, worse yet, could be split between the two, making the voice of CSOs
largely ineffective in both processes.
Proponents of the notion that the treaty and NAPs are in competition also
argue that, even if there is still attention given to the domestic implementation
of UNGPs, and even if CSOs are still able to mobilize around and advocate for
domestic implementation, States may use the treaty process as an excuse not
to act domestically.73 Because the ultimate content of the treaty is very unclear,
States may argue that doing anything on the national level before the treaty is
established will put their businesses at a competitive disadvantage if national
efforts go beyond treaty requirements or beyond what other States are doing
while the treaty is being drafted.74 As a consequence, States may use this as
67 See Loots, supra note 6.
68 See Taylor, supra note 7.
69 See Loots, supra note 6.
70 See Taylor, supra note 7.
71 Id.
72 See, e.g., Mark Taylor, TheMovement and the IGWiG, Inst. for Human Rights & Business,
July 3, 2015, http://www.ihrb.org/commentary/the-movement-and-the-igwig.html.
73 See Taylor, supra note 7.
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an excuse either not to create a NAP at all or to create a NAP, but only make
commitments to voluntary measures rather than more robust action.
Finally, it is possible that by reopening the discussion about the role of busi-
ness in relation to human rights abuses as part of the treaty process, there may
be backsliding, and the unprecedented consensus that was gained around the
UNGPs may be lost.75 The fact that the UNGPs received such wide support,
not only from governments, CSOs, and international organizations, but also
from business, was a hard won achievement. It should not be assumed, some
argue, that reopening the discussion will lead to greater protection of human
rights in relation to business activities but may instead result in a weakening of
the consensus around the UNGPs.76 If this consensus does break down it could
undermine existing NAPs as well as the need for governments to create them
in the future. Beyond the NAPs processes, a breakdown of this sort could also
undermine other ongoing efforts to implement the UNGPs, such as mandatory
non-financial reporting and the creation of a duty of care for parent corpora-
tions.77 If this fear is fulfilled, it would truly be a blow to ensuring corporations
do not cause or contribute to human rights violations in their operations.
C Antithesis: Moving Towards Harmony
C.1 Diversion of Resources and Attention
The fear that, due to diversion of resources and attention, the UNGPs (and
NAPs) would fall to the wayside as the treaty process moves forward, has so
far turned out to be unfounded.78 Specifically, this fear is undermined by the
fact that there is clear mobilization around the UNGPs.79 The list of NAPs that
have been completed or launched has grown since the treaty resolution was
adopted.80 Furthermore, the United Kingdom committed to reviewing and up-
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Securities and Exchange Commission, Specialized Corporate Disclosure (last modified
May 20, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/speccorpdisclosure.shtml;
Sherpa, A Historic First Step for Multinationals’ Duty of Care! (Mar. 31, 2015),
/urlhttp://www.asso-sherpa.org/historic-first-step-multinationals-duty-care#.ViVE5X6rSUk;
Gabriela Quijano, Parent Company Liability: Could Discussions Around a Treaty Prompt
States to do what they have so far Resisted?, Bus. & Human Rights Res. Ctr.,
http://business-humanrights.org/en/parent-company-liability-could-discussions-
around-a-treaty-prompt-states-to-do-what-they-have-so-far-resisted.
78 See Taylor, supra note 74.
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80 Finnish ministry of Employment and the Economy, National Action plan for the
Implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights(2014),
http://www.tem.fi/files/41214/TEMjul_46_2014_web_EN_21102014.pdf; Permanent Mis-
sion of the Republic of Lithuania to the United Nations Office, Lithuania’s Ac-
tion Plan on the Implementation of the United Nations Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights (2015), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/
NationalPlans/Lithuania_NationalPlanBHR.pdf; Government Offices of Sweden, Action
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dating its NAP (which was released in 2013) in 2015 and has indeed embarked
on that process.81 The fact that the United Kingdom is continuing to engage with
its NAP, along with the growing number of States that have published NAPs,
begun a NAP process, or committed to beginning a NAP process, suggests that
the treaty resolution has not, in reality, undermined advocacy around domestic
implementation of the UNGPs.82
The fact that there have been attempts on the national and regional level
to implement the UNGPs provides further evidence that the fear that the treaty
process would divert resources and attention has not come to fruition. Exam-
ples include legislation in France, Switzerland, and the United States, as well as
European Union Directives on extractives, non-financial reporting, and conflict
minerals.
In France, a landmark bill that would have created a duty of care for parent
companies in relation to human rights abuses and environmental damage in their
supply chains was introduced in November 2013.83 CSOs such as Sherpa and
the European Coalition for Corporate Justice (ECCJ) worked tirelessly to sup-
port this bill. Ultimately, the bill passed the first reading at the French National
Assembly on 30 March 2015, but unfortunately, was rejected by the French
Senate on 18 November 2015.84
If it had been enacted, this bill would have required the largest companies in
France (those with over 5,000 employees in France and over 10,000 employees
worldwide) to create a “vigilance plan” to prevent environmental damage and
adverse human rights impacts in their supply chains.85 The bill would have also
created civil and criminal liability for these companies for human rights viola-
tions abroad and, in such cases, the burden of proof would have been flipped,
requiring the company to show that it took necessary and reasonable measures
to prevent violations.86 Although the bill was not passed by the Senate, the fact
81 Bus. & Human Rights Res Ctr., Submissions: UK Natl. Action Plan Review Process
(2015), last visited Oct. 23, 2015, http://business-humanrights.org/en/submissions-uk-
natl-action-plan-review-process-2015.
82 In addition to those countries that have already published a NAP, twenty-eight countries are
either in the process of developing a NAP or have committed to creating one. These countries in-
clude the United States, Tanzania, Switzerland, Slovenia, Scotland, Portugal, the Philippines, Peru,
Myanmar, Mozambique, Morocco, Mexico, Mauritius, Malaysia, Latvia, Jordan, Ireland, Greece,
Germany, France, Ecuador, Colombia, Chile, Brazil, Belgium, Azerbaijan, Austria, and Argentina.
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Responsible for Human Rights Abuses by Subsidiaries Abroad, Bus. & Human Rights Res. Ctr.,
http://business-humanrights.org/en/opportunity-for-france-to-hold-companies-
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84 William Bourdon & Sandra Cossart, Open Letter to Mr. Eydoux, President of the National
Bar Council on a Resolution of 29 and 30 May on the Diligence of Multinationals, Sherpa (July
21, 2015), http://www.asso-sherpa.org/open-letter-mr-eydoux-president-national-
bar-council-resolution-29-30-may-diligence-multinationals#.Vtct5_krKUl; French
Senate Rejects Duty of Care Law: a Vote in Favour of Maintaining Corporate Impunity, European
Coalition for Corporate Justice (Nov. 23, 2015), http://corporatejustice.org/French-
Senate-rejects-duty-of-care-law-a-vote-in-favour-of-maintaining.html?lang=en.
85 Sherpa, supra note 79; Bourdon & Cosart, supra note 86.
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that the French National Assembly approved the bill, and that CSOs are rallying
behind it, is further evidence that resources and attention have not faded away
from the implementation of the UNGPs as a result of the treaty process.
Similarly, in Switzerland, a parliamentary proposal was put forward that
would have made human rights and environmental due diligence mandatory for
Swiss companies.87 The Swiss lower chamber of parliament initially accepted
the motion with a vote of 91 in favor and 90 against.88 However, after pressure
from business, a second vote was conducted and the motion was narrowly dis-
missed with a vote of 86 in favor and 95 against.89 In response to this denial,
the Swiss Coalition of Corporate Justice (SCCJ) has launched the Responsible
Business Initiative, which aims to advocate for mandatory human rights and en-
vironmental due diligence for Swiss companies.90 Specifically, the Responsible
Business Initiative is using a Swiss mechanism known as a “popular initiative”
to request a Constitutional amendment.91 The initiative is currently comprised
of about seventy-seven organizations.92
In the United States, mandatory non–financial reporting is required under
Dodd Frank Section 1502, which requires companies that use conflict minerals in
their products to conduct a “good faith” inquiry into their country of origin and
disclose whether those minerals came from the Democratic Republic of Congo
(or adjoining countries).93 Dodd Frank Section 1504 also requires extractive
companies (oil, natural gas, and minerals) to provide reports on the amount of
money paid to each government.94 The SEC issued a rule to implement Section
1504 in August 2012; however, the rule was challenged, and the U.S. District
Court for the District of Colombia vacated the rule in 2013.95 The SEC has
yet to promulgate a new final rule implementing section 1504.96 However, on 2
September 2015 Oxfam America won a case against the SEC in the U.S. Federal
District Court.97 The Court found that the SEC had ‘unlawfully withheld’ a
87 Corporate Justice, Conservative Backlash Blocks Increased Corporate Accountability,




90 Corporate Justice, Global Business? Global Responsibility! (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.




93 Securities and Exchange Commission, Fact Sheet: Disclosing the Use of Conflict
Minerals (last modified July 24, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/Article/Detail/Article/
1365171562058; Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 79.
94 Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 79.
95 Securities and Exchange Commission, Implementing the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (last modified Aug. 6, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/
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final rule, and its decision requires the SEC to expedite the rulemaking process
for Section 1504.98 In response, the SEC issued new draft rules to implement
section 1504 on 11 December 2015.99
The European Union has issued a directive similar to Dodd Frank Section
1504. In 2013, the EU passed a new Accounting Directive (2013/34/EU), which
requires annual reports from large extractive and logging companies on the
amount of money paid to governments in countries in which they operate.100
These reports will only have to include information about payments made in
excess of €100,000, but must be reported on a project-by-project basis.101 The
purpose of this directive is to increase transparency around company payments
to governments.102 This transparency will enable activists to see how much their
government earns from these companies, which can help those activists in the
fight against corruption.103 EUMember States were required to transpose this di-
rective into national law by 20 July 2015.104 Additionally, the Accounting Direc-
tive was amended by an EU Directive on non-financial reporting (2014/95/EU)
which was issued in the fall of 2014.105 This Directive requires that large public
transparency-advocates-as-federal-court-sides-with-oxfam-america/.
98 Id.
99 Oxfam, Oxfam welcomes draft oil and mining sunshine rule, Oxfam America (Dec.
11, 2015), http://www.oxfamamerica.org/press/oxfam-welcomes-draft-oil-and-mining-
sunshine-rule/.
100 Directive 2013/34, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on
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interest entities (e.g. listed companies) include information about their policies
and risks related to human rights, the environment, diversity, social and em-
ployee related issues, and anti-corruption and bribery.106 The EU is also moving
towards issuing a directive on the topic of human rights due diligence and con-
flict minerals, although what the exact content of the directive will be remains
unknown.107
In addition to the legislationmentioned above, there is alsomovement among
some businesses to adapt the UNGPs’ due diligence standard and to become a
part of reporting frameworks such as the Reporting and Assurance Frameworks
Initiative (RAFI).108 Because the UNGPs include broad principles on reporting,
initiatives such as RAFI have been created to give companies further guidance on
both the scope and scale of reporting, as well as methods of gathering and dis-
closing that information.109 Companies are becoming more and more involved
in these initiatives.110 For example, five different companies in five different sec-
tors have already adopted RAFI’s reporting framework.111 These companies in-
clude Nestlé, Unilever, H&M, Ericsson, and Newmont Mining Corporation.112
This movement is a positive sign and suggests that the treaty is not diverting at-
tention, including the attention of business, away from UNGP implementation.
The attention of civil society has also not been diverted by the treaty pro-
cess. Members of the business and human rights community have been heavily
engaged in the implementation of the UNGPs by producing assessments, de-
veloping benchmarking metrics, and ranking companies within certain sectors.
For example, IICAR and ECCJ re-released an updated assessment in November
2015 (originally released in 2014) that provides an in-depth look at the strengths
and weaknesses of each individual NAP that had been released at that point, as
well as an overall assessment of trends in existing NAPs.113 This assessment was
also used as a mechanism to engage with governments about the content of their
NAPs, as well as to provide examples of best practices and pitfalls to other gov-
ernments embarking on a NAP process.
Moreover, a new benchmarking initiative, the CorporateHumanRights Bench-
mark (CHRB), is expected to be in its pilot phase in 2015, with its first official
106 Id.
107 European Parliament, Conflict Minerals: MEPs Ask for Mandatory Certification of EU Im-
porters, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20150513IPR55318/
html/Conflict-minerals-MEPs-ask-for-mandatory-certification-of-EU-importers (last
visited May 20, 2015, 2:19 PM).
108 Amol Mehra & Sara Blackwell, The Rise of Non–financial Disclosure: Reporting on Respect
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company ranking publicly available in 2016.114 The CHRB plans to rank the top
500 listed companies and will consider each corporation’s “human rights pol-
icy, process[,] and performance.”115 In addition to this benchmarking initiative,
other ranking initiatives that focus on individual sectors have been or will be re-
leased despite the ongoing treaty process. For example, Ranking Digital Rights
will release its 2015 Corporate Accountability Index in November 2015.116 This
Index ranks sixteen of the largest internet and telecommunications companies
(ICT) based on thirty-one indicators on company commitments, policies, and
practices related to human rights generally and freedom of expression and right
to privacy specifically.117
Oxfam’s Behind the Brands campaign is another example of a sector specific
ranking of companies based on human rights performance.118 The Behind the
Brands campaign is a ranking of the ‘big 10’ food and beverage companies,
including General Mills, Mondelez, and Unilever, among others.119 The ranking
considers company policies in relation to seven different themes and provides
a score from one to ten for each company under each topic.120 Those themes
are land, women, farmers, workers, climate, transparency, and water.121 The
scorecard was first released in February 2013 and has had subsequent iterations
in September 2013, February 2014, October 2014, and most recently in March
2015. 122
The fact that CSOs are still engaging in assessments of UNGP implementa-
tion, that a large–scale human rights benchmarking initiative is in the works,
and that sector–based rankings of companies are still underway provides fur-
ther evidence that energy around and resources devoted to the UNGPs and their
implementation has not been undermined by the treaty process.
C.2 The Treaty Process as an Excuse for Inaction
Although there was a concern that States would use the treaty process as an ex-
cuse to halt any domestic implementation of the UNGPs (including by creating
114 Inst. for Human rights & Bus., Corporate Human Rights Benchmark (CHRB), http:
//www.ihrb.org/our-work/corporate-human-rights-benchmark.html (last visited Oct. 23,
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117 Id.; Ranking Digital Rights, Frequently Asked Questions, https://
rankingdigitalrights.org/who/frequently-asked-questions/#Q1 (last updated Nov.
6, 2015).
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NAPs), there are examples of States not doing this. Specifically, the U.K. Mod-
ern Slavery Bill was introduced to Parliament on 10 June 2014.123 Section 54 of
the Act (Transparency in Supply Chains) applies to businesses with total annual
turnover of £36 million or above that do business in the United Kingdom.124
This section requires these businesses to create a “slavery and human trafficking
statement” and publish it on their website.125 The statement must include infor-
mation about what steps the business is taking to ensure that there is no modern
day slavery in its supply chains. If the business it not taking any steps, it must be
expressly stated.126 The State could have argued that it would be better to wait
to enact such a bill (i.e. halt implementation of the UNGPs) until the contents of
the treaty are established to ensure that other States would be required to create
similar bills. However, the U.K. passed this Bill into law on 26 March 2015.127
The Modern Slavery Act is an example of a State having the opportunity to use
the treaty process as an excuse, but not doing so.
Additionally, although the mandatory human rights due diligence motion
was not ultimately passed in Switzerland, the fact that it passed during the first
vote suggests that the government is at least willing to consider taking national
action to implement the UNGPs despite the existence of the treaty process.128
C.3 Fear of Backsliding
The argument that the consensus around the UNGPs could be weakened or lost
by opening up the dialogue again is the most concerning. This could still be a
danger. One way that civil society is attempting to ensure the backslide does
not happen is by narrowing the scope of the treaty discussion.129 Specifically,
ESCR–Net and FIDH have launched a two-year project with the aim of provid-
ing concrete proposals about the treaty to the IGWG.130 These proposals will
be based on multiple consultations with civil society, academics, activists, and
representatives of people affected by business activity.131
As Professor Ruggie himself pointed out in his remarks to the Human Rights
Council when he presented them with the UNGPs, the UNHRC’s endorsement
of the UNGPs “mark[s] the end of the beginning: by establishing a common
123 UK Modern Slavery Law Comes into Effect, Bus. & Human Rights Res. Ctr., http://
business-humanrights.org/en/uk-modern-slavery-act-comes-into-effect
124 UK Home Office, Transparency in Supply Chains Etc. a Practical Guide 4–5 (Oct.
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global platform for action, on which cumulative progress can be built, step-by-
step, without foreclosing any other promising longer-term developments.”132 Al-
though the fear of backslide exists, the treaty and NAPs processes may actually
be able to build on the consensus that exists around the UNGPs. As discussed in
more detail below, the process required to create a NAP and the process required
to negotiate a binding treaty both have the potential to build capacity and trust
among different stakeholders. This capacity and trust can help stakeholders en-
sure that the treaty dialogue builds upon the UNGPs, instead of dissolving the
consensus.
D Synthesis: Two Roads Converged
As noted above, in his remarks to the UNHRC when he presented them with
the UNGPs, Professor John Ruggie stated that the UNGPs were not intended
to be an end goal, but rather a floor that could be built upon in the future.133
Both NAPs and the treaty process are a means of building upon the UNGPs
and pushing the implementation of business respect for human rights further.
On the one hand, through NAPs, governments provide concrete commitments
to implement the UNGPs on a national level, and CSOs can then work to hold
governments accountable for the commitments made therein.134 On the other
hand, an international treaty will create binding obligations, either on States
or directly on companies, to ensure that companies do not have adverse human
rights impacts in their operations. Both of thesemeasures build upon the UNGPs,
which were meant to be a floor, and push the business and human rights agenda
further. In addition to both building on the UNGPs, NAPs and the treaty process
can affirmatively support and complement each other.
D.1 Targeting the Treaty
In order to be effective, the binding treaty cannot remain a broad treaty that
attempts to cover all business and human rights issues.135 As mentioned above,
civil society is currently attempting to build consensus about what topics the
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treaty should cover.136 The process of creating a NAP can help inform this dia-
logue and the ultimate content of the treaty.137 As highlighted above, one major
step in creating a NAP that all States should engage in is creating a National
Baseline Assessment (NBA).138 As mentioned earlier, the States that have pub-
lished NAPs so far have not conducted NBAs. However, Germany, which is in
the process of drafting its NAP, released its NBA on 6 May 2015.139 Similarly,
Chile has committed to using a NBA to inform the creation of its NAP.140 The
purpose of a NBA is to map existing laws and policies that provide human rights
protections in the context of business operations.141 This mapping is then used
to identify gaps that exist that should be “filled” through commitments in the
NAP.142 NBAs created as part of the NAPs process in each country can be used
to identify trends in gaps across jurisdictions.143 These trends could shed light
on the sectors or business and human rights issues (e.g., parent company liability
or access to and quality of non-judicial grievance mechanisms) where there are
the most pressing gaps, which in turn could inform the content of the treaty and
help to move it in a more targeted direction.144 Similarly, NBAs and commit-
ments that governments make in NAPs can provide evidence about where there
is the most agreement among States.145 Because State consensus will be needed
to create a binding treaty, finding out what types of business and human rights
issues States already agree on through their NAPs commitments could be useful
for narrowing the content of the treaty.146
D.2 Compliance with Treaty Obligations
Regardless of the ultimate content of the treaty, it will still need to be imple-
mented domestically once enacted. If a State has already conducted a NBA, pro-
duced an initial NAP, and updated and revised its NAP, it will be much easier for
that State to identify the legal and policy changes that need to be made domes-
tically in order to be treaty compliant.147 By beginning the NAP process now,
States will be able to at least know what domestic changes need to be made more
quickly if and when a treaty is enacted than if they have not completed a NAP.
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D.3 Business and Human Rights Capacity Building
Another important aspect of the NAPs process that could benefit the treaty is
stakeholder consultation.148 These consultations should aim to bring together a
diverse group of individuals and organizations from civil society, government,
business, and affected communities.149 In addition to these consultations, States
should also create a NBA as part of the NAPs process.150 In some States, civil so-
ciety organizations have conducted shadow NBAs.151 Both these consultations
and these official and shadow NBAs create or increase the capacity and knowl-
edge of stakeholders, including government, around business and human rights
issues.152 Additionally, participation in consultations and the research required
to create an official or shadow NBA can help stakeholders learn about the cur-
rent level of implementation of the UNGPs, as well as major gaps in their own
domestic context.153 This knowledge and capacity can help ensure that govern-
ment and civil society engagement with the treaty process is deeper and more
meaningful.
Because business and human rights covers such a broad area of topics, those
responsible within government for implementing the UNGPs and any treaty obli-
gations that are created are interspersed throughout government.154 For exam-
ple, relevant actors include procurement officials and policymakers, prosecutors,
and legislators, to name a few.155 This fact makes it difficult for civil society and
government officials themselves to identify those within government responsible
for various tasks that are relevant to business and human rights. By engaging in
consultations, shadow or official NBAs, and the NAPs process generally, civil so-
ciety actors and government officials have andwill learn key business and human
rights actors in government. Beyond simply knowing who the key government
actors are, the NAPs process may help to create lasting relationships between
civil society and relevant government officials, as well as enhanced communi-
cation and collaboration within the government itself. The knowledge of key
players, as well as the formation of relationships, will benefit the treaty process
because civil society will know whom within government to push to be involved
148 Id. at 16, 38.
149 Id. at 16,38, 43.
150 Id. at 31, 17, 37, 44.
151 International Corporate Accountability Roundtable, “Shadow” National Baseline
Assessment (NBA) of Current Implementation of Business and Human Rights Frameworks: The
United States, Pillar I (Mar. 2015), http://icar.ngo/analysis/launch-of-icars-shadow-u-
s-national-baseline-assessment-pillar-1/;International Corporate Accountability
Roundtable, “Shadow” National Baseline Assessment (NBA) of Current Implementation of Busi-
ness and Human Rights Frameworks: The United States, Pillar III (June 2015), http://icar.ngo/
analysis/launch-of-icars-shadow-u-s-national-baseline-assessment-pillar-iii/.
152 Danish Inst., supra note 3, at 81.
153 Id. at 17
154 The UNGPs themselves evidence the broad topics covered—procurement, prosecutors, trade,
etc. For example, commentary to UNGP 7 says “home states should foster closer cooperation among
their development assistance agencies, foreign and trade ministries, and export finance institutions
in their capitals and within their embassies, as well as between these agencies and host Government
actors.” Ruggie, supra note 4.
155 Id.
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in the treaty negotiations, and civil society’s relationships with them will make
their participation in the treaty process more likely.
Staff at the International Corporate Accountability Roundtable (ICAR) have
personal knowledge of the power of consultations and shadow NBAs to in-
crease the business and human rights capacity and knowledge of civil society
and government. In November 2014, ICAR, the Legal and Human Rights Cen-
tre (LHRC) in Tanzania, the Centre for Human Rights at the University of Pre-
toria (CHR) in South Africa, and the Khulumani Support Group in South Africa
launched a NAPs project in both Tanzania and South Africa.156 One objec-
tive of this project was to build the capacity of civil society groups in Tanza-
nia and South Africa157 on business and human rights issues in general, and
NAPs in particular.158 To achieve this objective, ICAR and its partners worked
with three National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) to conduct workshops
in both South Africa and Tanzania.159 These NHRIs were the Danish Institute
for Human Rights (DIHR), the Tanzanian Commission on Human Rights and
Good Governance (CHRAGG), and the South African Human Rights Commis-
sion (SAHRC).160
Both workshops took place in July 2015, and both workshops had about
twenty civil society representatives and twentyNHRI representatives present..161
These workshops provided a valuable opportunity to build civil society capac-
ity in relation to business and human rights, and to increase knowledge about
relevant actors within the government. ICAR’s partners in Tanzania and South
Africa are also currently writing shadow NBAs, which has and will continue
to increase their (and ICAR’s) knowledge about the existing level of UNGP im-
plementation in their own domestic context.162 ICAR has recently announced a
similar project in Mexico in partnership with the Project on Organizing, Devel-
opment, Education, and Research (PODER).163
Additionally, when the U.S. Government announced that it would be creat-
ing a NAP on business and human rights, staff at ICAR began researching and
156 International Corporate Accountability Roundtable, ICAR Partners with LHRC,
CHR, & Khulumani to Support the Development of National Action Plans on Business & Human
Rights in Tanzania and South Africa, http://icar.ngo/analysis/icar-partners-with-lhrc-chr-khulumani-
to-support-the-development-of-naps-in-tanzania-south-africa/ (last visited Oct 23, 2015).
157 Tanzania has announced it will create a NAP, while South Africa has not.
158 Danish Inst., supra note 131; International Corporate Accountability Roundtable,
Project Update: Workshops on Business & Human Rights in Tanzania & South Africa,
http://icar.ngo/analysis/project-update-workshops-on-business-human-rights-
in-tanzania-south-africa/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2015).
159 International Corporate Accountability Roundtable, Project Update: Workshops
on Business & Human Rights in Tanzania & South Africa, http://icar.ngo/analysis/
project-update-workshops-on-business-human-rights-in-tanzania-south-africa/ (last




163 International Corporate Accountability Roundtable, ICAR & PODER Partner to Support
the Development of a National Action Plan on Business & Human Rights in Mexico, ICAR,
http://icar.ngo/analysis/icar-poder-partner-to-support-the-development-of-a-
national-action-plan-on-business-human-rights-in-mexico/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2016).
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writing a shadow NBA on U.S. implementation of Pillars I and III.164 Through
this process, ICAR staff and the broader business and human rights community
working on U.S. Government policy learned invaluable information about laws,
policies, and initiatives in the United States that are relevant to business and
human rights, the strengths and weaknesses of those laws, and existing gaps in
UNGP implementation. This information allowed ICAR to create very targeted
and detailed recommendations to the U.S. Government about what should be
included in the NAP.165 The capacity and knowledge built through the work-
shops and shadow NBA process in Tanzania and South Africa, and through the
shadow NBA process in the United States, will increase the likelihood that if
these organizations engage in the treaty process, that engagement will be deeper
and more meaningful.
D.4 Increasing South-South and North-South Relationships
Historically, the Global North has dominated the human rights agenda.166 As
noted earlier, many of the States that are backing the treaty are from the Global
South.167 Additionally, CSOs in the Global South are mobilizing and joining to-
gether to discuss the treaty, for example, through the Peoples Forum on Human
Rights and Business.168 As these Global South CSOs mobilize around the treaty
discussion, it could help to foster and strengthen South-South business and hu-
man rights networks.169 Not only will the dialogue around the treaty strengthen
South-South relationships, it could also provide an opportunity for CSOs in the
Global North and those in the Global South to strengthen or create relationships
with one another. Both types of relationships can benefit not only the movement
around the treaty but also the business and human rights movement more gen-
erally, including the UNGPs and NAPs.
First, the dialogue among CSOs across the globe about the treaty can serve
as a means to connect CSOs from the Global South and the Global North, form-
ing relationships and helping them to identify potential areas of collaboration
outside of the treaty process, namely, in relation to implementing the UNGPs.170
164 ICAR, supra note 146.
165 International Corporate Accountability Roundtable, Key Recommendations—
Pillar I (Mar. 2015), http://icar.ngo/analysis/launch-of-icars-shadow-u-s-
national-baseline-assessment-pillar-iii/; International Corporate Accountability
Roundtable, Key Recommendations—Pillar III (June 2015), http://icar.ngo/analysis/
launch-of-icars-shadow-u-s-national-baseline-assessment-pillar-iii/.
166 People’s Forum on Human Rights and Business, Welcome and Introduction, http:
//peoplesforum.escr-net.org/pf-live/2014/9/30/welcome-and-introduction (last visited
Oct. 23, 2015).
167 Loots, supra note 6.
168 People’s Forum on Human Rights and Business, http://peoplesforum.escr-net.org
(last visited Oct. 23, 2015).
169 See Peoples’ ForumonHumanRights and Business,Next Steps in Treaty Advocacy, http:
//peoplesforum.escr-net.org/pf-live/2014/10/1/next-steps-in-treaty-advocacy (last
visited Oct. 23, 2015).
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Ensuring that measures taken to implement the UNGPs actually have an impact
on affected communities is imperative. By having relationships across regions,
CSOs across regions can take steps to make sure the business and human rights
reforms for which they are advocating are actually the reforms that are needed.
Second, the strengthening of south-south networks around the treaty may
bleed into advocacy around the UNGPs.171 The more organized these CSOs are,
the easier it is for them to mobilize to advocate for shared objectives, and the
louder their voice will be. This is especially important at the UN level, which is
less accessible to CSOs in the Global South than CSOs from the Global North.172
Barriers to access to the UN for the CSOs in the Global South include the fact
that they tend to be smaller and have fewer resources than their counterparts
in the Global North, making attending multiple UN conferences impractical or
even impossible.173 Although measures to increase the ability of Global South
organizations to participate at the UN would be ideal, having a unified move-
ment on business and human rights in the Global South will at the very least
increase the strength of these organizations’ voice. If such a movement or net-
work is built around the treaty, such as through the Peoples Forum, this could
also benefit the movement around the implementation of the UNGPs and NAPs.
For example, at the Peoples Forum in 2014 many organizations “emphasized
the need to view the treaty as only one of many parallel efforts in attempting to
end the evasion of corporate accountability.”174 One parallel effort could be the
domestic implementation of the UNGPs.
D.5 The Treaty as a Spur, Not a Legal Chill
Finally, the treaty may actually be mobilizing civil society around the UNGPs.
As noted in a piece written by Phil Bloomer, a senior UN official informed him
that “he had seen more energy in the GPs in the first month after the treaty
vote than in the previous year—implying the treaty vote had acted as a political
spur to the Guiding Principles rather than creating a ‘legal chill.”’175 Instead of
diverting resources and attention away from the UNGPs, as feared by some, the
171 At the 2014 Peoples Forum, many organizations “emphasized the need to view the treaty
as only one of many parallel efforts in attempting to end the evasion of corporate accountabil-
ity.” Peoples’ Forum on Human Rights and Business, Next Steps in Treaty Advocacy, http:
//peoplesforum.escr-net.org/pf-live/2014/10/1/next-steps-in-treaty-advocacy (last
visited Oct. 23, 2015).
172 Although the percentage of UN Accredited organizations from the Global South has increased
since 1996, in 2007 UNAccreditation is still dominated by the US (29%) and Europe (37%). United
Nations, Number of NGOs in Consultative Status with the Council by Region, http://www.un.
org/esa/coordination/ngo/pie2007.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2015).
173 Angela Zeitler, NGO Participation at the United Nations: Barries and Solutions 1, 5 (Dec.
2009), http://csonet.org/content/documents/BarriersSolutions.pdf.
174 Forum, supra note 165.
175 Phil Bloomer, Unity in Diversity: the Advocates for the Guiding Principles and Bind-
ing Treaty can be Complementary, Bus. & Human Rights Res Ctr., http://business-
humanrights.org/en/unity-in-diversity-the-advocates-for-the-guiding-principles-
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treaty process may actually be injecting the discussion around the UNGPs with
more energy.176
First, civil society and governments have not abandoned the UNGPs as a
result of the treaty process. This is supported by the continued publication of
NAPs, civil society publications assessing those NAPs, attempts to enact domes-
tic legislation such as those in France and Switzerland, continued work around
existing legislation such as Dodd Frank in the United States, and the existing
EU directives on extractives and non-financial reporting, and the potential EU
action.
Second, the attention generated by the treaty could bring business and hu-
man rights issues into the sphere of awareness of organizations and individuals
that may not previously have engaged in the business and human rights commu-
nity. The UNGPs have been around for over four years and, while they are key
to players that are already in the business and human rights community, people
and organizations outside of that community may be unfamiliar with them or
entirely unaware of their existence. The attention-grabbing nature of this treaty
resolution could cause CSOs not involved in business and human rights to be-
come interested in the topic, attracting more voices with fresh perspectives to the
conversation around business and human rights in general. Having more CSOs
involved in the discussion will not only bring new voices to the table, but will
also make the call for State and corporate action to ensure corporate respect for
human rights throughout their operations much louder.
E Conclusion
Not only are the treaty process and efforts to implement the UNGPs (including
through NAPs) not in competition, but they can actually benefit one another.
There is evidence that initial fears that the treaty process would divert resources
and attention away from the UNGPs and NAPs and that States would use the
treaty process as an excuse not to take steps to implement the UNGPs have not
come about. Specifically, States are continuing to engage in the NAPs process,
there is regulatory action at the domestic and regional level to implement the
UNGPs, corporations are engaging with the UNGPs through reporting initia-
tives, and civil society organizations are robustly assessing State implementation
of the UNGPs throughNAPs assessments and benchmarking initiatives. The fear
that reopening the discussion will create the chance for backsliding and a loss of
consensus about business responsibility for human rights abuses, while not en-
tirely gone, should not paralyze us and keep us from pushing the conversation
forward. The UNGPs were only ever meant to be a first step, with the intention
that other steps would be taken to build on their foundation. Additionally, civil
society is making efforts to narrow the scope of the treaty and build consen-
sus around what the treaty should address, which will narrow the scope of the
discussion and mitigate the risk of backsliding.
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Beyond not being in competition, the treaty process and the implementation
of the UNGPs and creation of NAPs can reinforce one another. The NAPs pro-
cess can support the treaty process by helping to target and focus the treaty, by
helping States identify what changes need to be made domestically in order to
comply with any treaty that does get drafted, and by making State and civil soci-
ety engagement with the treaty process deeper and more meaningful by building
business and human rights capacity. Conversely, the treaty process can enhance
implementation of the UNGPs by creating or strengthening relationships among
civil society organizations in the Global North and the Global South, strength-
ening already existing civil society networks, and by bringing new perspectives
and breathing new energy into the business and human rights community.
There is much work to be done to drive up business respect for human rights.
Civil society organizations are working towards this goal both by engaging in
the treaty process and by advocating for the implementation of the UNGPs at the
national level through NAPs and beyond NAPs. In the end, stakeholders do not
need to choose one or the other, but can, and should, support and be involved
in both initiatives.
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